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Recovery after stroke: not so proportional
after all?
Thomas M. H. Hope,1 Karl Friston,1 Cathy J. Price,1 Alex P. Leff,2,3 Pia Rotshtein4 and
Howard Bowman4,5
The proportional recovery rule asserts that most stroke survivors recover a ﬁxed proportion of lost function. To the extent that this is true,
recovery from stroke can be predicted accurately from baseline measures of acute post-stroke impairment alone. Reports that baseline
scores explain more than 80%, and sometimes more than 90%, of the variance in the patients’ recoveries, are rapidly accumulating. Here,
we show that these headline effect sizes are likely inﬂated. The key effects in this literature are typically expressed as, or reducible to,
correlation coefﬁcients between baseline scores and recovery (outcome scores minus baseline scores). Using formal analyses and simulations,
we show that these correlations will be extreme when outcomes are signiﬁcantly less variable than baselines, which they often will be in
practice regardless of the real relationship between outcomes and baselines. We show that these effect sizes are likely to be over-optimistic
in every empirical study that we found that reported enough information for us to make the judgement, and argue that the same is likely to
be true in other studies as well. The implication is that recovery after stroke may not be as proportional as recent studies suggest.
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Introduction
Clinicians and researchers have long known stroke patients’
initial symptom severity is related to their longer term out-
comes (Jongbloed, 1986). Recent studies have suggested that
this relationship is stronger than previously thought: that
most patients recover a ﬁxed proportion of lost function.
Studies supporting this ‘proportional recovery rule’ are rap-
idly accumulating (Stinear, 2017): in ﬁve studies since 2015
(Byblow et al., 2015; Feng et al., 2015; Winters et al., 2015;
Buch et al., 2016; Stinear et al., 2017), researchers used the
Fugl-Meyer scale to assess patients’ upper limb motor
impairment within 2 weeks of stroke onset (‘baselines’),
and then again either 3 or 6 months post-stroke (‘out-
comes’). The results were consistent with earlier observations
(Prabhakaran et al., 2008; Zarahn et al., 2011) that most
patients recovered 70% of lost function. Taken together,
these studies report highly consistent recovery in over 500
patients, across different countries with different approaches
to rehabilitation, regardless of the patients’ ages at stroke
onset, stroke type, sex, or therapy dose (Stinear, 2017).
And there is increasing evidence that the rule also captures
recovery from post-stroke impairments of lower limb function
(Smith et al., 2017), attention (Marchi et al., 2017; Winters
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et al., 2017), and language (Lazar et al., 2010; Marchi et al.,
2017), and may even apply generally across cognitive do-
mains (Ramsey et al., 2017). Even rats appear to recover
proportionally after stroke (Jeffers et al., 2018).
Strikingly, many of these studies report that the baseline
scores predict 80–90%, or more, of the variance in empir-
ical recovery. When predicting behavioural responses in
humans, these effect sizes are unprecedented. Recently,
Winters and colleagues (2015) reported that recovery pre-
dicted from baseline scores explained 94% of the variance
in the empirical recovery of 146 stroke patients. Like many
related reports (Stinear, 2017), this study also reported a
group of (n = 65) ‘non-ﬁtters’, who did not make the pre-
dicted recovery. But if non-ﬁtters can be distinguished at
the acute stage, as this and other studies suggest (Stinear,
2017), the implication is that we can predict most patients’
recovery near-perfectly, given baseline scores alone. Stroke
researchers are used to thinking of recovery as a complex,
multi-factorial process (Nelson et al., 2016). If the propor-
tional recovery rule is as powerful as it seems, post-stroke
recovery is simpler and more consistent than previously
thought.
In what follows, we argue that the empirical support for
proportional recovery is weaker than it seems. These results
are typically expressed as, or reducible to, correlations be-
tween baselines and recovery (outcomes minus baselines).
These analyses pose well known challenges that have been
discussed by statisticians for decades (Lord, 1956; Oldham,
1962; Cronbach and Furby, 1970; Hayes, 1988; Tu et al.,
2005). Much of this discussion is focused on problems
induced by measurement noise, and measurement noise
was also the focus of the only prior application of that
discussion to the proportional recovery rule (Krakauer
and Marshall, 2015). Here, we argue that empirical studies
of proportional recovery after stroke are likely confounded
entirely regardless of measurement noise.
Our argument is that: (i) correlations between baselines
and recovery are spurious when they are stronger than cor-
relations between baselines and outcomes; (ii) this is likely
when outcomes are less variable than baselines; which
(iii) will often happen in practice, whether or not recovery
is proportional. This argument follows from a formal ana-
lysis of correlations between baselines and recovery, which
we introduce below and illustrate with examples. Armed
with that analysis, we then re-examine the empirical sup-
port for the proportional recovery rule.
The relationships between
baselines, outcomes, and
recovery
For the sake of brevity, we deﬁne ‘baselines’ = X,
‘outcomes’ = Y, and ‘change’ (recovery) = : i.e. YX.
The ‘correlation between baselines and outcomes’ is
r(X,Y), and the ‘correlation between baselines and
change’ is r(X,). Finally, we deﬁne the ‘variability ratio’
as the ratio of the standard deviation () of Y to the stand-
ard deviation of X: Y/X.
X and Y are construed as lists of scores, with each entry
being the performance of a single patient at the speciﬁed
time point. We assume that higher scores imply better per-
formance, so r(X,) will be negative if recovery is propor-
tional (to lost function). One can equally substitute ‘lost
function’ (e.g. maximum score minus actual score), for
‘baseline score’, but while this makes r(X,) positive if re-
covery is proportional, it is otherwise equivalent.
Strong correlations imply the
potential for accurate predictions
Strong correlations between any two variables typically imply
that we can use either variable to predict the other. Out-of-
sample predictions should tend toward the least-squares line
deﬁned by the original (in-sample) correlation. Some empir-
ical studies use this logic to derive ‘predicted recovery’ (p)
from the least-squares line for r(X,), reporting r(p,) in-
stead of r(X,) (Winters et al., 2015; Marchi et al., 2017).
Since the magnitudes of r(X,) and r(p,) are the same by
deﬁnition (see Fig. 1 and Supplementary material, proposition
8 in Appendix A), the preference for either expression over
the other is arguably cosmetic.
Nevertheless, the correlation between predicted and empir-
ical data is a common measure of predictive accuracy: the
stronger the correlation, the better the predictions. Very
strong correlations are unusual when predicting behavioural
performance in humans—both because behaviour itself is com-
plex, and because of measurement noise in behavioural assess-
ment. Once r(p,)40.95, for example (Winters et al.,
2015), this prognostic problem has seemingly been ‘solved’
more accurately than many might have thought possible.
r(X,) is spurious when
(non-trivially) stronger than r(X,Y)
Recovery is precisely the difference between baselines and
outcomes. When r(X,) is strong, implying that we can pre-
dict recovery accurately given baselines, it is tempting to
assume that we can also predict outcomes equally accurately,
by simply adding predicted recovery to baselines. More for-
mally, the assumption is that r(X + p,Y) r(p,). This
assumption is wrong.
In fact, r(X + p,Y) r(X,Y) (see Fig. 1 and
Supplementary material, proposition 8 in Appendix A).
When recovery is predicted from baselines, the correlation
between ‘baselines plus predicted recovery’ and outcomes,
is never stronger than the correlation between baselines and
outcomes. When r(X,) is (substantially) stronger than
r(X,Y), r(X,) is ‘spurious’, because it encourages an
over-optimistic impression of how predictable outcomes
are, given baselines.
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The canonical example of spurious
r(X,)
The canonical example of spurious r(X,) is when X and Y
are independent random variables with the same variance:
Y/X1 and r(X,Y) 0, but r(X,)0.71 (Oldham,
1962). This r(X,) suggests that we can predict recovery
relatively well, but we cannot use ‘predicted recovery’ to
predict outcomes equally well (Fig. 1).
Krakauer and Marshall (2015) recently argued that this
scenario has little relevance to (most) empirical studies of re-
covery after stroke. This is because: (i) spurious r(X,) only
emerge here when r(X,Y) is weak; and (ii) empirical r(X,Y)
are usually strong, because X and Y are dependent, repeated
measurements from the same patients. If spurious r(X,) only
or mainly emerged when Y/X 1 and r(X,Y)0, they
might indeed be irrelevant in practice. Unfortunately, spurious
r(X,) also emerge in another scenario, which is very
common in studies of recovery after stroke.
Spurious r(X,) are likely when pY/pX
is small
For any X and Y, it can be shown that:
rðX;Þ ¼ Y :rðX;YÞ  Xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2Y þ 2X  2:X:Y :rðX;YÞ
q ð1Þ
A formal proof of Equation 1 is provided in the
Supplementary material, Appendix A [proposition 4 and the-
orem 1; also see (Oldham, 1962)]; its consequence is that
r(X,) is a function of r(X,Y) and Y/X. To illustrate that
function, we performed a series of simulations (Supplementary
material, Appendix B) in which r(X,Y) and Y/X were varied
independently. Figure 2 illustrates the results: a surface relat-
ing r(X,) to r(X,Y) and Y/X. Figure 3 shows example
recovery data at six points of interest on that surface.
Point A corresponds to the canonical example of spuri-
ous r(X,), introduced in the last section: i.e. Y/X 1
and r(X,Y)0, but r(X,)0.71 (Fig. 3A). At Point B,
Y/X 1 and r(X,Y) is strong, so recovery is approxi-
mately constant (Fig. 3B) and r(X,)0, consistent with
the view that strong r(X,Y) curtail spurious r(X,)
(Krakauer and Marshall, 2015). However, the situation is
more complex when Y/X is more skewed.
When Y/X is large, Y contributes more variance to
YX (), and r(X,) r(X,Y); this is Regime 1. Points
C and D illustrate the convergence (Fig. 3C and D). By
contrast, when Y/X is small, X contributes more variance
to YX, and r(X,) r(X, X): i.e. 1 (Supplementary
material, Appendix A, theorem 2); this is Regime 2, where
the confound emerges. Point E, near Regime 2, corresponds
to data in which all patients recover proportionally
( = 70% of lost function; Fig. 2E). Here, Y/X is already
small enough (0.3) to be dangerous: after randomly shuf-
ﬂing Y, r(X,Y) 0, but r(X,) is almost unaffected (Point
F, and Fig. 3F). In other words, if even the proportional
recovery rule is approximately right, empirical data may
enter territory, on the surface in Fig. 2, where over-opti-
mistic r(X,) are likely.
pY/pX may be small, whether or not
recovery is proportional
Proportional recovery implies small Y/X, but small Y/X
does not imply proportional recovery; for example,
Figure 1 A canonical example of spurious r(X, ). Baselines scores are uncorrelated with outcomes (A), but baseline scores appear to be
strongly correlated with recovery (B). That correlation can be used to derive predicted recovery, which is strongly correlated with empirical
recovery (C), but predicted outcomes, derived from that predicted recovery, are still uncorrelated with empirical outcomes (D).
Recovery after stroke BRAIN 2019: 142; 15–22 | 17
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/brain/article-abstract/142/1/15/5233860 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 24 O
ctober 2019
constant recovery with ceiling effects will produce the same
result. To illustrate this, we ran 1000 simulations in which:
(i) 1000 baseline scores are drawn randomly with uniform
probability from the range 0–65 (i.e. impaired on the 66-
point Fugl-Meyer upper-extremity scale); (ii) outcome
scores were calculated as the baseline scores plus half the
scale’s range (33); and (iii) outcome scores greater than 66
were set to 66 (i.e. a hard ceiling). Mean r(X,Y) and r(X,)
were calculated both before and after shufﬂing the out-
comes data for each simulation. After shufﬂing,
r(X,Y)0 and r(X,) = 0.88: ceiling effects make Y/X
small enough to encourage spurious r(X,). And just as
importantly, before shufﬂing, r(X,Y) = 0.89 and
r(X,) = 0.90: even when r(X,) is not spurious [because
r(X,Y) is similarly strong], we cannot conclude that recov-
ery is really proportional.
Re-examining the empirical
literature on proportional
recovery
The relationships between r(X,Y), r(X,) and Y/X merit
a re-examination of the empirical support for the
proportional recovery rule. In the only study we found,
which reports individuals’ behavioural data, Zarahn and
colleagues (2011) consider 30 patients’ recoveries from
hemiparesis after stroke. Across the whole sample,
r(X,Y) = 0.80 and r(X,) = 0.49; after removing seven
non-ﬁtters: r(X,Y) = 0.75 and r(X,) = 0.95. Removing
the non-ﬁtters increases the apparent predictability of re-
covery but reduces the predictability of outcomes (and re-
duces Y/X from 0.88 to 0.36). Notably, the residuals for
both correlations are identical (Fig. 4), and in fact this is
always true (Supplementary material, proposition 9 in
Appendix A,). r(X,) has the same errors as r(X,Y), but
a larger effect size: r(X,) is over-optimistic.
We can also use Equation 1 to reinterpret studies that do
not report individual patient data. One example is the ﬁrst
study to report proportional recovery from aphasia after
stroke (Lazar et al., 2010). Here, r(X,)0.9 and
Y/X 0.48; Equation 1 implies that r(X,Y) was either
0.78 or zero. Similarly, in the recent study of propor-
tional recovery in rats (Jeffers et al., 2018), Y/X0.8,
and r(X,)0.71; by Equation 1 r(X,Y) was either
much stronger (40.95) or considerably weaker (0.29)
than r(X,). In both cases, r(X,) tells us less than ex-
pected about how predictable outcomes really were, given
baselines.
Several recent studies report interquartile ranges, rather
than standard deviations, for their ﬁtter patients’ baselines
and outcomes. Accepting some room for error, we can also
estimate Y/X from those interquartile ranges. In one case
(Winters et al., 2015), r(X,) = 0.97 and Y/X = 0.158,
while in another (Veerbeek et al., 2018), Y/X = 0.438 and
r(X,)0.88. In both cases, Equation 1 implies that
r(X,) would be at least as strong as that reported, regard-
less of r(X,Y): these reported r(X,) do not tell us how
predictable outcomes actually were, given baseline scores.
Many studies in this literature only relate baselines to
recovery through multivariable models (Buch et al., 2016;
Marchi et al., 2017; Winters et al., 2017); in these studies,
we cannot demonstrate confounds directly with Equation
1. Nevertheless, these studies are also probably con-
founded, because any inﬂation in one variable’s effect size
will inﬂate the multivariable model’s effect size as well. As
discussed in the previous section, empirical studies of re-
covery after stroke should tend to encourage small Y/X,
whether or not recovery is proportional. Consequently, the
null hypothesis will rarely be that r(X,)0. For example,
in the only multivariable modelling study, which reports
IQRs for its ﬁtter-patients’ baselines and outcomes
(Stinear et al., 2017), Y/X0.48, which implies that
the weakest r(X,) was 0.88, for any positive value of
r(X,Y).
Finally, while r(X,) can be misleading if it is extreme
relative to r(X,Y), the reverse is also true. One study in this
literature, which uses outcomes as the dependent variable
rather than recovery (Feng et al., 2015), reports that
r(X,Y) 0.8 and Y/X = 1.2 in their ‘combined’ group of
76 patients. By Equation 1, r(X,) = 0.05: i.e. recovery
Figure 2 The relationship between r(X,Y), r(X,) and
pY/pX. Note that the x-axis is log-transformed to ensure symmetry
around 1; when X and Y are equally variable, log(Y/X) = 0.
Supplementary material, proposition 7 in Appendix A, provides a
justification for unambiguously using a ratio of standard deviations in
this figure, rather than Y and X as separate axes. The two major
regimes of Equation 1 are also marked in red. In Regime 1, Y is more
variable than X, so contributes more variance to , and
r(X,) r(X,Y). In Regime 2, X is more variable than Y, so X con-
tributes more variance to , and r(X,) r(X,X) (i.e. 1). The
transition between the two regimes, when the variability ratio is not
dramatically skewed either way, also allows for spurious r(X,). For
the purposes of illustration, the figure also highlights six points of
interest on the surface, marked A–F; examples of simulated recovery
data corresponding to these points are provided in Fig. 3.
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was uncorrelated with baseline scores. These authors only
reported proportional recovery in a subsample of their pa-
tients (but not the information we need to re-examine that
claim), but their full sample seems better described by con-
stant recovery (as in Fig. 3B).
Discussion
The proportional recovery rule is striking because it implies
that recovery is simple and consistent across patients (non-
ﬁtters notwithstanding), and because that implication ap-
pears to be justiﬁed by strong empirical results (Stinear,
2017). We contend that the empirical support for the rule
is weaker than it seems.
In summary, our argument is that r(X,) is spurious
when stronger than r(X,Y), and that the conditions that
encourage spurious r(X,) will be common in empirical
studies of recovery after stroke, whether or not recovery
is really proportional. Many empirical r(X,) in this litera-
ture appear to be spurious in this sense. And in any case,
strong r(X,) are insufﬁcient evidence for proportional re-
covery even if they are not spurious [because r(X,Y) is
similarly strong].
The only previous discussion of the risk of spurious
r(X,), in analyses of recovery after stroke (Krakauer and
Figure 3 Exemplar points on the surface in Fig. 2. Simulated recovery data, corresponding to the points A–F marked on the surface in Fig.
1. (A) Baselines and outcomes are entirely independent [r(X,Y) = 0], yet r(X,) is relatively strong; this is the canonical example of mathematical
coupling, first introduced by Oldham (1962). (B) Recovery is constant with minimal noise, so baselines and outcomes are equally variable (Y/
X 1) and recovery is unrelated to baseline scores (r(X, ) 0). (C and D) Outcomes are more variable than baselines (Y/X 5), and r(X,)
converges to r(X,Y). (E) Recovery is 70% of lost function, so outcomes are less variable than baselines (Y/X 0.3); even with shuffled outcomes
data (F) baselines and recovery still appear to be strongly correlated.
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Marshall, 2015), concluded that this risk is small provided
the tools used to measure post-stroke impairment are reli-
able: i.e. so long as measurement noise is minimal.
Crucially, our analysis applies entirely regardless of
measurement noise. We contend that the risk of spurious
r(X,) is signiﬁcant, if there are ceiling effects on the scale
used to measure post-stroke impairment, and if most pa-
tients improve between baseline and subsequent assess-
ments. These criteria will usually be met in practice,
because every practical measurement of post-stroke impair-
ment employs a ﬁnite scale, and because non-ﬁtters, who
do not make the predicted recovery, are removed prior to
calculating r(X,).
We are not suggesting that there is anything wrong with
the practice of distinguishing ﬁtters from non-ﬁtters. Indeed,
our results prove that this work may be valid regardless of
our other concerns. Non-ﬁtters do not recover as predicted;
by deﬁnition, they contribute the largest, negative residuals
to r(X,). Since the residuals for r(X,Y) and r(X,) are
identical (Fig. 4 and Supplementary material, proposition 9
in Appendix A), the same patients will be placed in the same
subgroups regardless of which correlation is used, and bio-
markers that distinguish those subgroups at the acute stage
[i.e. avoid the circularity of relying on observed recovery
(Stinear, 2017)], will be equally accurate regardless of our
other concerns. However, extreme r(X,) for patients
classiﬁed as ﬁtters, will naturally encourage the assumption
that those ﬁtters’ outcomes are largely determined by initial
symptom severity. If this assumption is true, therapeutic
interventions must be largely ineffective (or at least redun-
dant) for these patients. Our analysis suggests that this as-
sumption is wrong.
Nevertheless, we are not claiming that the proportional
recovery rule is wrong. Our analysis suggests that empirical
studies to date do not demonstrate that the rule holds, or
how well, but we could only conﬁrm that r(X,) was over-
optimistic in one study, which reported individual patient
data. And while we have also shown that extreme r(X,)
and r(X,Y) can result from non-proportional (constant) re-
covery, this is simply one plausible alternative hypothesis
about how patients recover.
Quite how to interpret empirical recovery with conﬁ-
dence in this domain remains an open question: we
have articulated a problem here, hoping that recognition
of the problem will motivate work to solve it. But we
can make some recommendations for future studies in the
ﬁeld.
First, these studies should report r(X,), r(X,Y), and
Y/X, for those patients deemed to recover proportionally.
Despite our concerns about r(X,), we do learn something
when r(X,Y) is strong, but r(X,) is weak, as in Feng and
colleagues’ (2015) results discussed above, which appeared
Figure 4 r(X,Y) and r(X,) have the same residuals. Left: Least squares linear fits for analyses relating baselines to (top) outcomes and
(bottom) recovery, using the fitters’ data reported by Zarahn et al. (2011). Middle: Plots of residuals relative to each least squares line, against the
fitted values in each case. Right: A scatter plot of the residuals from the model relating baselines to change, against the residuals from the model
relating baselines to outcomes: the two sets of residuals are the same.
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to be better explained by constant recovery than by pro-
portional recovery.
Second, future studies should consider explicitly testing
the hypothesis that recovery depends on baseline scores
(Oldham, 1962; Hayes, 1988; Tu et al., 2005; Tu and
Gilthorpe, 2007; Chiolero et al., 2013). These tests sens-
ibly acknowledge that the null hypothesis is rarely
r(X,) 0 in these analyses. However, they do not ad-
dress the proper measurement and interpretation of
effect sizes, which is our primary concern here; somewhat
paradoxically, this means that they may be less useful in
larger samples than in smaller samples (Friston, 2012;
Lorca-Puls et al., 2018).
Those hypothesis tests will also all be confounded by
ceiling effects. We recommend that future studies should
measure the impact of such effects, perhaps by reporting
the shapes of the distributions of X and Y (greater asym-
metry implying more prominent ceiling effects). Future
studies should also attempt to minimize ceiling effects.
One approach might be to remove patients whose out-
comes are at ceiling: though certainly inefﬁcient, this
does at least remove the spurious r(X,) in our simula-
tions of constant recovery (see above). However, it may be
difﬁcult to determine which patients to remove in practice;
the Fugl-Meyer scale, for example, imposes item-level ceil-
ing effects, which could distort Y/X well below the max-
imum score. A better, though also more complex
alternative, may be to use assessment tools expressly de-
signed to minimize ceiling effects, or to add such tools to
those currently in use.
More generally, we may need to replace correlations
with alternative methods, which can provide less
ambiguous evidence for the proportional recovery rule.
One principled alternative might use Bayesian model com-
parison to adjudicate between different forward or genera-
tive models of the data at hand: i.e. using the empirical
data to quantify evidence for or against competing hypoth-
eses about the nature of recovery, which may or may
not be conserved across patients. We hope that this
paper will encourage work to develop such methods, de-
livering better evidence for (or against) the proportional
recovery rule.
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